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On the Spot
The Double Immersion of Virtual Reality 
Martin Warnke
Since its invention, virtual reality has promised strictly localized and simulta- 
neously boundless mobility: it gives the user the impression of being in a whole 
new world while remaining in the same place and time. This paradox strips 
distant and simulated locations of their sense of danger and their exclusiveness, 
while eliminating the user’s need to actually travel to reach them. You can prac- 
tice flying a fighter jet or driving a tank without putting passengers and equip- 
ment at risk; you can engage in combat without actually risking your life; you 
can relax in a tropical paradise without having to fly to get there; you can fly 
through buildings without running the risk of falling - and all this while staying 
put. The cybemauts chase their phantasms from within a cube with an edge 
length of one meter, as if they were figures in a painting by Francis Bacon. Vir- 
tual reality is the only technologically possible method of immersing into com- 
puter worlds that remains thoroughly paradoxical. How this is possible and 
where this leads are the focus of this essay.
1. Immersion as Illusion 
The Technology of Virtual Reality
Virtual reality, a highly sophisticated, technological, and extremely com- 
plex informatic illusion-producing machine, has, since its invention by 
Ivan Sutherland in 1968, been beset by a significant paradox. The strik- 
ing contradiction between the freedom of movement it promises and the 
physical ‘dispositif of its users seems to be at its phantasmic core. While 
cybemauts effortlessly travel through an endless virtual world, they are 
in a kind of iron maiden that encloses them on the spot. Immobile free- 
dom, or local boundlessness - this seems to be the paradox of virtual 
reality as a technology of immersion and is the subject of this article.
We will see that the materiality of virtual reality, as described by Ivan 
Sutherland in the mid-1960s, was the cause of this phantasmic charge. 
Newer technologies that, in principle, have the same function, though in 
entirely other forms, appear completely different, or at least do not give 
rise to comparable paradoxes. Classical virtual reality is thereby histo- 
ricized as a maximally invasive technology of immersion.
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Ivan Sutherland, the founder of virtual and augmented reality, be- 
came famous as an engineer of graphic machines. In 1963, he intro- 
duced Sketchpad to the public, a man-machine graphical communica- 
tion system that was to become the precursor to all interactive 
computer graphics and computer-aided design programs (see 1963). 
With a light pen, one could draw figures on the screen that would then 
be manipulated, as needed, by geometric operations in industrial de- 
sign processes. This device created the basis for all subsequent com- 
puter-graphic systems and ultimately for virtual reality as well (see 
lllustration 1).
Two years later, Sutherland described what could be called an 
engineer’s vision, namely a display that could depict not only thin line 
graphics but anything you wanted: “A display connected to a digital 
computer gives us a chance to gain familiarity with concepts not re- 
alizable in the physical world. It is a looking glass into a mathematical 
wonderland” (1965: 506). We have to bear in mind that at this time 
punch cards were still high-tech, as can be seen in the film Caprice 
(dir. Frank Tashlin, USA 1967) starring Doris Day (see Illustration 2). 
Multi-medial, multi-colored, and fast-moving scenes were still far 
beyond anything that could be displayed by computer graphics. Thus, 
the wonderland that Sutherland envisioned was more abstract in 
mathematical-physical terms, a sphere that was normally invisible or 
unknown in nature like negative mass. But Sutherland, as an engineer, 
also rigorously embraced fantasies of an improved technology that 
would equate simulation and reality in a way that the French philoso- 
pher Jean Baudrillard evoked a decade later (see 1981). Sutherland’s 
first virtual room definitely bears traits of a fantasy of omnipotence:
The ultimate display would, of course, be a room within which the computer can 
control the existence of matter. A chair displayed in such a room would be good 
enough to sit in. Handcuffs displayed in such a room would be confining, and a bul- 
let displayed in such a room would be fatal. With appropriate programming such a 
display could literally be the Wonderland into which Alice walked. (Ibid.: 508)
Here, virtual reality is the wonderland of wishful fantasy. What Suther- 
land fails to consider, however, is who exactly would want to sit hand- 
cuffed to this chair in a room where a shooting will take place.
His ideas become more explicit in 1968, the year Sutherland pub- 
lished a paper describing an actual technological invention: the head- 
mounted display as the core display technology of virtual reality (see 
1968). This device allowed for an immersion in the terms of informa-
Illustration 2:
Film still from Caprice (dir. Frank Tashlin, USA 1967).
tion theory because it was capable of displaying spaces and actions in 
3-D and in real time as if the participant were really there. It required a 
complex system of sensorics, computing, and display and can be con- 
sidered a masterpiece of technological artistry (see Hlustration 3). The 
cybemaut, whose eyes were not bound but rather equipped with two 
mini televisions, could turn, lift, and lower his head. An apparatus then 
measured his movement, while both eyes were offered a section of a 
virtual scene rendered by the computer, which corresponded exactly to 
the movement of the head. Whenever the user, for example, turned his 
head to the left, a part of the field of vision on the right would disap- 
pear, while on the left, a new section of the scene would slide into 
view. The apparatus was constructed on the basis of psychological re- 
search, which suggested that spatial-visual impressions are related to 
the perceiver’s movement in space. Heinz von Foerster expresses this 
idea in the words of Humberto Maturana when he says: ‘We see with 
our legs’ (“Wir sehen mit den Beinen”; 1995: 242). NASA further de- 
veloped the technology in the 1980s by adding stereoscopic graphics 
and stereo sound and by giving it a boost toward photo-realism.
This is the prehistory of virtual reality as a technology of immer- 
sion into imaginary computer-generated spaces.
2. The Paralyzed Cybernaut
Without any real-life experience of spatial vision, of the feedback 
loop between movement and perception, it would be impossible to 
acquire 3-D vision while navigating through a virtual environment. 
This is the case because the cybernaut is more or less tied to the pole 
of the technological device and his movements are restricted to an area 
of roughly one cubic meter, as any further movement would exceed 
the capacities of the sensorics that continually determine his precise
Illustration 3: 
lllustration from Ivan Sutherland, 
“A Head-Mounted Three 
Dimensional Display” (1968).
location in space. Curiously, all fiction- 
al versions of virtual reality assume 
spatial immobility during visits to vir- 
tual worlds as if they were all subject 
to the same technological restrictions 
of engineering design. Without excep- 
tion, all of the cybernauts portrayed by Stanisiaw Lem and Oswald 
Wiener, by the Wachowskis and James Cameron, have some kind of 
walking disability.
In 1964, at the same time as Ivan Sutherland, Stanisiaw Lem de- 
veloped the idea of virtual reality, which in his Summa Techrtologiae 
he calls ‘phantomology’. He envisions a technological setting in which 
the nerve impulses of a person - for example, a man sitting on his ve- 
randa and smelling a rose - are recorded first. (That in itself would, in 
fact, lead to the death of the volunteer, as not only his nerves but also 
his brain would have to be tapped in order to record all of the impuls- 
es.) The recorded nerve impulses would then have to be inserted back 
into the nervous system of someone lying in lukewarm water in an 
isolation tank, thus constituting the actual ‘phantomology’:
And thus when our man is resting in the dark, while a series of impulses are 
traveling along all of his nerves into his brain - impulses that are exactly the 
same as those that traveled along his nerves when he was sitting on a veranda 
with a rose in his hand - he will subjectively find himself in that situation again. 
He will see the sky, a rose in his hand, a garden in the background behind the 
veranda, grass, children playing, and so on. (Lem 1964/2013: 198)
So far, this sounds idyllic, but then he continues:
A somewhat similar experiment has already been conducted on a dog. First, the 
impulses traveling along the dog’s motor nerves while it was running were re- 
corded, after which the dog’s spinal cord was cut. Its hind legs thus became para- 
lyzed. When the electric recording was inserted into the nerves of the paralyzed 
limbs, the hind part of the dog that has been paralyzed “came back to life,” per- 
forming the same movements that are performed by a normal dog while running. 
(Ibid.)
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Furthermore, at roughly the same time as Lem and Sutherland, Os- 
wald Wiener - a member of Viennese Actionism who participated in 
the Uni-Ferkelei action, an obscene performance at the University of 
Vienna, and was a comrade-in-arms of the not-at-all-squeamish artists 
Otto Miihl and Hermann Nitsch - described, in his 1969 novel Die 
Verbesserung von Mitteleuropa (‘The Improvement of Central Eu- 
rope’), a virtual reality that considered the body of the cybernaut 
somewhat dispensable, and bloodily did away with it piece by piece. 
Wiener does not leave it at paralyzing the legs but, fictionally, pro- 
ceeds to amputate body parts of the travelers in virtual worlds, whom 
he calls ‘bio-modules’ (“bio-module”; 1969/1985: CLXXXI):
[...] while, for example, the leg of a bio-module is being amputated, he is per- 
haps enjoying a refreshing walk through a scenic Hungarian landscape. The 
adapter simulates the complex interplay of the efferent nerves with kinesthetic 
and proprioceptive fibers, and a look at his leg tells the bio-module, at most, that 
the pleasure he is taking in physical activity is doing more and more good for the 
muscles in his extremities.1
Here, the double immersion of virtual reality becomes apparent. Not 
only does the cybernaut invade artificial worlds, the virtual-reality ma- 
chine, at the same time, invades the cybemaut’s body.
In The Matrix (dir. Andy and Lana Wachowski, USA/Australia 
1999), the passage into virtual reality, similar to Sutherland’s engineer- 
ing vision, is staged like an execution (see Illustration 4): the props of 
the Tast walk’ range from the nervous prisoner’s shaved head and prison 
clothing to the reassuring gestures of the executioner, who even closes 
the condemned’s eyelids before pushing the spike into his neck. The 
Matrix is a collection of nearly every cinematic stereotype about virtual 
reality that portrays it as being only accessible to those rendered abso- 
lutely immobile - those bound on the spot.
In the virtual-reality epic Avatar (dir. James Cameron, USA/UK 
2009), the paradox of the freedom of the incarcerated is portrayed in 
a similarly striking manner. The opening sequence shows, quite sin-
1 “[...] wahrend z. b. gerade ein bein des bio-moduls amputiert wird, geniefit derselbe
vielleicht einen erfrischenden fussmarsch durch reizvolle ungarische landschaften. der 
adapter simuliert das komplexe wechselspiel der efferenten nerven mit kinasthetischen 
und propriozeptiven fasem und ein blick auf seine beine belehrt den bio-modul hoch- 
stens iiber die tatsache, dass seine bewegungsfreude dem muskelspiel seiner ex- 
tremitaten immer besser bekomme." (Wiener 1969/1985: CLXXXI) Unless otherwise 
indicated, all translations are mine.
isterly, the hero on a six-year-long trip in a kind of ‘space morgue’ 
(see Illustration 5) and the burial of his twin brother in a cardboard 
box. The hero himself is already disabled, a paraplegic like Stanisiaw 
Lem’s laboratory dog. Before his legs can ‘come back to life’, how- 
ever, he must enter what looks like an iron maiden. His passage into 
virtual reality is staged as his being buried alive. There follows the 
apotheosis: in the body of his avatar, the resurrected Jake can once 
again feel his legs; he childishly and recklessly indulges in his artifi- 
cial dream of running, just like Oswald Wiener’s bio-module.
3. The Structure of the Immersion Machine
Virtual reality is an established fictional topos, triggered and manifest- 
ed by a technology that, through data helmets, tracking systems, and 
other equipment, encloses and immobilizes cybernauts’ bodies in order 
to illusorily invade unlimited virtual worlds. The main motive is a wish 
machine that confines, straps, impales, and mutilates the test subject, 
accompanied by the fantasies of the narrator. Fictional virtual reality is 
a wish fulfiller, much like a dream, dependent on a more or less sado- 
masochistic author.
The submission to a dominant machine frames this wish fulfill- 
ment and creates a phantasmic setting, which, depending on the psy- 
chological disposition of the operator or narrator, can range from an 
authoritarian-technocratic to a mildly violent or even a manifestly sa- 
domasochistic fantasy. Oswald Wiener’s fantasies of the ‘bio-adapter’ 
and David Cronenberg’s fantasies of the ‘Videodrome’2 (Videodrome,
2 I kindly thank Lisa Gotto for drawing this to my attention.
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Illustration 4: 
Film still from The Matrix (dir. Andy and 
Lana Wachowski, USA/Australia 1999).
Canada 1983) are the sadistic consequences of 
the virtual reality described by Ivan Sutherland, 
whose vision in “The Ultimate Display”, as we 
recall, is reminiscent of a mafia-style execution 
scene, including a chair, handcuffs, and bullets.
In retrospect, technological developments point out the fact that 
the violent streak in virtual reality arises from a clearly visible rela- 
tionship between body and machine: a fetish. By contrast, today’s 
technologies - playing on the most microscopic computers that are 
completely in our power and already part of our bodies: smartphones 
- no longer require a painful or pleasurable act of submission. An ex- 
ample of this is the iPhone pet, a pet that lives in the augmented real- 
ity of the smartphone. In his film World on a Wire (Welt am Draht, 
West Germany 1973), Rainer Werner Fassbinder already envisions a 
virtual word in which an apparatus of physical submission is no lon- 
ger required: here, the world is ‘on a wire’ and not under the ‘coffin 
lid’ of virtual reality. The film thus relegates virtual reality as a topos 
to history, claiming that it belongs to the mainframe computer of the 
1940s and 1950s, and not to today’s networked world (see Warnke 
2011). This is what makes World on a Wire avant-garde and The Ma- 
trix and Avatar kitsch: the latter make use of a concept of immersion 
that dates back to the 1960s and relies on an outdated ‘dispositif’ of 
localization.
Since then, however, the virtual has become inseparably interwo- 
ven with the real; it has become ubiquitous. It has also become much 
more confusing, because one no longer has to enter into an ‘iron maid- 
en’ in order to be part of a computed world. As is shown in World on a 
Wire, there is no longer a staged passage into an artificial fantasy world. 
Our orientation is lost, because we don’t know whether we ourselves 
are observing or are being observed, whether we are in the so-called 
real or in the so-called virtual world: the apparatus disappears in the 
palms of our hands, in our clothing, in our bodies, in the air. An inter- 
face that, in an emergency, could be rejected no longer exists. Even 
the wire that Fassbinder’s world is still attached to and that, in ex-
Illustration 5:
Film still from Avatar (dir. James Cameron, USA/UK 2009).
treme cases, could be cut off no longer exists. With it, the spot where 
the singularity of a defined passage could still be localized has disap- 
peared as well. This dreadful spot, a terrifying place, can no longer be 
banished, severed, or avoided by a dream with a happy ending.
The existence of such a spot or place has itself become a desire 
and a fantasy, a set piece in an irrecoverable techno-romanticism, as 
shown in The Matrix and Avatar. In reaiity, its time has passed once 
and for all.
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